Abstract
1.
Introduction This paper argues that roads should be treated as a regulated public utility, and road charges set accordingly to yield a stable and defensible revenue stream. An efficient structure of charges would confront road users with the marginal social cost of their decisions, but there are limits to the precision with which this can be done. Congestion externalities make up the larger part of the efficient road user charge, with road damage costs and externalities a relatively small part. Accident externalities are hard to measure, and could be small in comparison to other costs. Other environmental costs affect non-road users as much as road users, and are therefore best dealt with by corrective taxes (and standards). If governments could set out and defend the total revenue to be collected for road use, and the environmental taxes, then it would be politically easier to move to a more efficient structure of road user charges, such as congestion or road pricing. The level of road user charges dictated by the regulated public utility model are not inconsistent with an efficient set of road prices, provided that the level of road investment is set efficiently. The public utility model has the additional advantage that it is more likely to deliver efficient investment than current budgetary arrangements.
Road users require access to expensive road infrastructure, and impose a variety of external costs on each other (congestion, accident risks) and on non-road users (accident risks, pollution, noise, and environmental degradation). They typically pay special excise duties on fuel, and annual licence charges for the right to use highways. They may also pay special taxes on vehicle purchase, though these are less common now in developed countries. Increasingly, countries impose tolls for certain roads and bridges, often as the means to pay the private concession holder, while charges to enter congested urban areas have been introduced in Singapore, Norway and other countries. Most of these are neither designed for, nor defended as, methods of optimising traffic flows, as they rarely vary by time of day or in response to traffic conditions. Instead they are normally justified as a fair means of financing improved transport systems (for motorists and through better public transport). Nevertheless, they remind us that road pricing is likely to be a more efficient way of dealing with traffic congestion than the existing blunt instruments of fuel excises and public transport subsidies. Figure 1 shows the excise taxes (excluding VAT) on road fuels across the EU, together with the US and New Zealand, which stand out for their relatively low tax rates. The countries are ranked by the tax on gasoline (petrol), and it is noticeable that diesel is less heavily taxed in all countries except the UK, despite the greater fuel efficiency of diesel vehicles (and hence the lower tax per km even when equally taxed). Heavy vehicles in New Zealand pay weight and distance related taxes so that there is no road tax reason to tax diesel fuel. Road fuels have always been lightly taxed in the US, in contrast to Europe, raising sharply the question whether, as Parry and Small (2001) ask, the optimal gasoline tax is closer to the US or European level.
Figure 1 Fuel duties
There are conceptually two quite distinct ways of deciding on the appropriate level of road user charges. An ambitious student of optimal public finance might attempt to maximise social welfare subject to a set of tax instruments and a government budget constraint. Social welfare would depend on individual utility, defined over transport services, labour, time spent travelling, accident risk, pollution, leisure, and all other goods. Pollution, accident risk, and travel time would depend on location, demand for travel, and the level of traffic and fuel use. The problem is then to determine the optimal level of such instruments as the gasoline tax (and all other taxes, possibly subsumed into a labour tax). Parry and Small (2001) provide an excellent example of this approach, and show how the gasoline tax should be set to deal with pollution, congestion, and social welfare more generally, balancing the distortionary effects on fuel and vehicle use against the reduction in labour tax distortions. Under certain assumptions the gasoline tax can be set without regard to these wider policy objectives. This ambitious top-down or general equilibrium equilibrium approach can be contrasted with a more partial or bottom-up approach that concentrates on the road sector initially in isolation, and only considers wider issues (such as raising additional revenue) at a later stage. Both approaches have their advantages and limitations. As with any exercise in optimal taxation, the model employed has to be greatly simplified to be tractable. It risks overlooking features of congestion and road investment that may be critical for the design of road user charges. The bottom-up approach breaks the problem down into manageable components that can be quantified, and for which tax and charging instruments can be properly tailored. It is relatively silent on the larger question of how much additional revenue should be raised from road users to contribute to general taxation. That answer will depend on the kind of issues addressed by optimal tax theorists, and on questions of political economy.
1
The approach taken here is bottom-up, with a final section discussing some of the wider tax issues. On this approach an efficient structure of charges and taxes on road users would contain the following components:
• Efficient charges for using scarce and costly road space, including congestion charges and road damage costs;
• Charges (more properly, corrective taxes) for other externalities, such as pollution, noise, and accidents;
• General taxes that apply to the majority of goods, such as the standard rate of VAT;
• Additional taxes or subsidies that are justified by wider policy considerations (or are not justified by any of the preceding).
The last category can be thought of as a balancing item, as most taxing authorities do not distinguish between the separate components that make up the existing system of charging and taxation. For our purposes, it reminds us that there may be additional revenue-raising and redistributive arguments for further taxation that are not covered by any of the previous distinct categories.
The third category can be ignored once we have dealt with one important conceptual issue. The first two categories are corrective taxes or charges to ensure that road users face prices that reflect the social cost of road use. If the prices are right, then so ought to be decisions about vehicle acquisition and use. These prices would then correspond to efficient producer prices elsewhere in the economy, and as such should be subject to the standard rate of VAT. In most developed countries with a system of VAT, excise duties on fuel are also subject to VAT. In some countries the level of fuel taxes exceeds the amount justified under the first two categories. There will then be additional VAT on the excess of these taxes over the corrective component, and that part of the total VAT should be considered to be part of the residual tax system. At present, commentators typically either exclude all VAT (the convention of the British Office of National Statistics in classifying road taxes) or include all VAT in the total level of road taxes (the practice of the British Automobile Association in arguing that motorists are over-taxed). This approach is conceptually defensible although rather difficult to implement.
The remainder of the paper shows how to set road user charges following this scheme, illustrating the method with data from the Britain. Table 1 gives basic data for British traffic and tax revenue from fuel taxes and Vehicle Excise Duty, as well as emissions of various pollutants. 
2.
Road User Charges There are two apparently conflicting approaches to setting road user charges that can be reconciled under not unreasonable conditions. The first approach is to set charges that cover the total costs of operating the network (the way in which privatised network utilities operate). The second is to charge the difference between the marginal social cost (MSC) and the average private cost (APC) of road use. If we leave on one side the non-congestive externalities, which will be dealt with below, the main reason why the MSC typically exceeds the APC is that road users impose congestive externalities on other road users. In addition, heavy vehicles cause wear and tear disproportionately to their number (damage increases as the fourth power of the axle weight), and this damage raises vehicle operating costs for other road users. There is therefore both a direct damage cost and an additional road damage externality to be included in the MSC.
Charging efficient prices (to charge for user costs and internalise these two externalities) and charging to recover average costs might appear to be quite different approaches likely to give quite different answers. Newbery (1986 Newbery ( , 1987 identifies the conditions under which the two are equal. Road damage externalities averaged over the network are zero providing the highway authority maintains a condition-responsive maintenance programme -that is, it repairs roads when they fall to a predetermined level of deterioration. Charging efficient congestion prices will exactly recover the total costs of providing road infrastructure (including costs caused by weather damage) provided that the marginal cost of road expansion is constant. The proposition that SRMC = LRMC = AC for efficiently priced and supplied constant returns to scale industries will be familiar (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; Mohring, 1970; Strotz, 1965) . 2 The result here is more surprising as AC includes the quite considerable weather damage costs, which may account for half the total operating costs.
This immediately raises two questions: whether there are economies or diseconomies of scale to expanding roads, and whether it is reasonable to suppose that roads are optimally supplied and priced. If we consider the first question, the evidence is mixed. For inter-urban roads in relatively unpopulated areas, there is some evidence of mild increasing returns to scale or decreasing costs. Doubling a two-lane road to a four-lane road almost doubles the capacity per lane and hence almost quadruples total capacity, but the cost of intersections increases considerably. Keeler and Small (1977) analyse US inter-urban data and give their best point estimate as AC/MC=1.03 (but with a high standard error), suggesting slight increasing returns to scale. Kraus (1981) combines a number of estimates to get AC/MC=1.19 explicitly accounting for intersections.
In densely populated and urban areas, the marginal cost of road expansion may be extremely high and exceed the average cost. This suggests that inter-urban and urban roads should probably be treated differently for charging purposes. If we include minor roads which act as feeders to the inter-urban road network, efficient congestion pricing would not be in conflict with average cost pricing, provided the highway authorities expanded roads when justified by social cost-benefit analysis.
The answer to the second question as to whether roads are optimally priced and supplied is almost certainly not in all cases. If Britain, the typical benefit-cost ratio for potential inter-urban road projects is substantially greater than one, suggesting considerable under-investment and marginal congestion costs that exceed the average costs of expansion. In North America, with sub-optimal fuel excises, the opposite may be true. That raises the important issue of advising on the appropriate level of road charges and taxes in suboptimally managed transport budgets.
The short-run marginal social cost (SRMSC) will be on average higher than the longrun MSC (LRMSC) if there is under-investment in roads. If governments then defend road charges/taxes by reference to the SRMSC they are effectively exercising market power to drive up the scarcity price of the natural monopoly under their control. The standard solution to the abuse of market power for natural monopolies is regulation to prevent exploitative pricing, with the requirement to meet demand at the regulated price. Regulated utilities in the private sector are normally allowed to recover their total costs, while being encouraged to price individual outputs efficiently (subject to the overall revenue constraint). The British model of price-caps and private utility regulation has been remarkably successful. 3 It suggests looking at the problem of setting road user charges as one of setting charges for a regulated natural monopoly road network.
3.
Revenue caps for road charges Where networks are under private ownership, regulation is required to prevent the natural monopoly owner exploiting consumers. Credible regulation is also required to protect the owner against expropriation by politically influential consumers and thus to persuade investors to undertake adequate investment. Over relatively long periods of time in the United States, and for more than a decade in the UK, the principles of setting charges for using natural monopolies have been clarified and codified.
The regulated charges should be set to recover the operating and capital costs of an efficiently run network. The capital cost consists of the interest (or return) on the opening value of the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB), and the depreciation (or decrease in value) of this value. A key part of setting the charges therefore consists in determining the RAB, measuring its depreciation, and determining the rate of return allowed on the RAB. In the case of indefinitely lived assets, like water mains and roads, depreciation may be replaced by the amount of expenditure needed to maintain its modern equivalent asset value. Over time the RAB is increased by new gross investment, and reduced by depreciation.
In the U.S. the RAB is equal to the written-down book value -that is the purchase cost (at historic value) less the accumulated value of depreciation. The rate of return is the money rate of interest that lenders would require to invest in that risk class of assets. This approach has the advantage that the assets can be financed by issuing bonds, but the drawback that the book value of assets may fall substantially short of the written-down modern equivalent asset (MEA) value at current prices, while money rates of interest can be quite unstable. Britain, with a longer and more painful experience of rapid and unpredictable inflation, adopted current cost accounting. 4 Assets are revalued each year by a suitable price index and earn a real rate of return rather than a money rate of return on their opening value.
Where assets are transferred from the public to the private sector, one of the critical issues to resolve is how they will be valued for subsequent resetting of price controls. This issue was essentially side-stepped with the early privatisations and only returned to haunt the regulators at the first periodic review. Most public assets had been sold at a considerable discount to MEA value, most noticeably for water where the sales price was less than 10% of the MEA. Over time, as investment increases the real value of the assets, the RAB will converge ultimately on the MEA value. In the case of water this process of convergence was assisted by a K-factor that augmented prices sufficiently rapidly to enable the large required investment programme to be financed.
5 Electricity and gas transmission systems were sold, and remain, at a considerable discount to MEA, and as their rate of investment is relatively slow compared to their asset value, this process of convergence may take decades. If we consider the road network, and were to adopt the same approach for setting charges to cover operating costs and the return to the owner (the State), there would be a major problem in determining the RAB. It is relatively straightforward to value inter-urban highways. Thus the British Highways Agency estimates that the strategic road network is worth £60 billion at 1998 prices (Drake, 2000) . The British strategic road network carries 34% of all road traffic and 67% of freight.
Valuing the rest of the road network, and particularly roads in built-up areas, is intrinsically problematic. The inherited road network reflects a gradual evolution in a largely pre-motorised era and is very unlikely to reflect an efficient road network system designed for motor traffic. It is, of course, possible (in principle) to determine the number of lane kilometres of roads of varying qualities, estimate their current state of repair, the cost of building a new road to that standard, and hence calculate the written down MEA for the entire system. In 1996 the then Department of Transport in Britain decided to undertake this exercise but has not yet produced a result. Newbery (1988) had already produced estimates from rolling forward the earlier published capital value of the road network by a permanent inventory method of adding new investment to that total. That number would be between £100-150 billion (1998 prices) for the UK. If the strategic road value of £60 billion is accepted, the rest of the network is worth between £40-90 billion, which may appear rather low. If the prime determinant of the cost of roads is the space required for vehicles, then one would expect the cost of the rest of the network to be as least as much of the strategic roads. Allowing for the higher costs of road building in urban areas, the amount could be substantially more, perhaps £140 billion, giving the total value as £200 billion.
The practical implications of this are that it may be useful to distinguish between urban and inter-urban roads. Inter-urban roads can probably be expanded in line with traffic demand at moderately constant costs, given sensible planning regulations. Increasing capacity on urban roads in contrast is often difficult or very costly. The appropriate capital value of inter-urban roads is therefore relatively simple to compute, but there will be a degree of arbitrariness in determining the RAB for urban roads, where honest opinions may differ a factor of two or more.
The second controversial element in determining the capital charge for the road network is the rate of return, or its private sector regulatory counterpart, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). This is typically built up from an assumed debt:equity ratio, the real rate of interest on risk-free debt, plus the (default) risk premium for private sector debt, while the equity return has a further equity risk premium. The correlation between the returns of the regulated asset and the market as a whole, or the value of Beta ($) then determines the extent to which the risks cannot be diversified (and hence are socially costly).
If we take Ofgem's recent price control of the gas transport network, Transco, as an example, the risk-free real rate is taken as i = 2.75%, the debt risk premium is * = 1.5-1.9%, giving the cost of debt as d = i+* = 4.25-4.65% (Ofgem, 2001) . The equity risk premium is taken as D = 3.5%, gearing as g = 62.5%, the equity beta as 1, to give the post-tax cost of equity as n = $(i+D) = 6.25%, or a pre-tax cost of equity as r = 8.9%, and a WACC of gd+(1-g)r =6-6.25% real. This is for a privately owned and regulated network, whereas the road network in publicly owned, raising the standard public economics question of what is the correct rate of interest to use in project appraisal and also for determining the capital charge for the public sector. Under the strong conditions of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) theorem that optimal commodity taxation preserves production efficiency, the public sector discount rate should be equal to the private rate of return. If so, and if beta for roads is also unity, then presumably the (pre-2002) UK Government test discount rate of 6% real is the correct rate to use. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) discuss the limitations of the result that the public and private sector discount rates should be equal, with the implication that the public sector may discount at a different and probably lower rate. The British Treasury was in 2001 revising its appraisal manual and was arguing for the considerably lower rate of 3.5% real. This was based on the argument that the social discount rate should reflect the rate at which the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing over time as a result of growth in consumption per head (taken as 2% p.a.). The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption was taken as -1, so the rate of fall of marginal utility is 2%, which, corrected by the risk of catastrophe (taken as 1.5%), gives a social discount rate of 3.5%. This is not the occasion to resolve the dispute over the correct treatment of the public sector discount rate that it is appropriate to use in determining capital charges, but only to note the considerable discrepancy between the two discount rates advocated for the public sector in Britain. If we take the RAB as £100-200 billion and the required rate of return as 3.5-6%, then the range of annual capital costs is £3.5 -£12 billion (excluding depreciation, better measured by the required level of maintenance to preserve intact the capital stock). Maintenance is about £3-4 billion p.a. (though perhaps ought to be somewhat higher), while fuel taxes and vehicle excise duty (the annual licence fee) collected £27.7 billion in 2000/01 (excluding all VAT, see table 1). Investment in the road network is running at about £2-3 billion p.a. while traffic in 2000 was 468 billion vehicle km. (Tables 1 and 2) .
Total road costs (made up of maintenance and other operating costs, and the capital charge, but excluding any other external costs) are thus between £7-17 billion per year, or 1.5-3.6p/VKT (vehicle km travelled), while road taxes were 5.9p/VKT. Section 5 and table 2 below estimates the cost of other environmental externalities as £3-9 billion/year. Taking the preferred values of £12 billion for the road costs and £5.45 billion for environmental externalities, gives £17.45 billion, on which VAT at 17.5% would be £3.05 billion. Fuel taxes yield £22.3 billion, and pay VAT of 17.5%, or £3.90 billion, so there is excess VAT of £0.85 billion. The balancing or pure tax element is therefore £27.7-17.45+0.85 = £11.1 billion.
One argument for setting road charges like prices for regulated natural monopolies is that it should clarify the role of road pricing, while providing a more secure funding basis for investment. As urban congestion grows, the argument for congestion pricing to improve the efficiency of road use grows steadily stronger. Road pricing has now been made legal in Britain in the Transport Act 2000, as has work-place car park levies. In both cases the Local Authority imposing these charges or levies can retain the revenue for ten years provided it is hypothecated to transport improvements. The Government has indicated that the revenues so generated will be additional to any transfers made under normal central budgetary arrangements to finance local transport improvements. It has not yet explained how this additionality will be assured, nor what mechanisms will protect road users from possibly rapacious Local Authorities, other than the power of the local ballot box.
If the total revenue to be collected from road charges were set in the same way as the revenue of private regulated networks, then a change in the form of charging to a more efficient and targeted form, such as congestion pricing, would not increase the total level of road charges. This would reassure road users that road pricing were not an additional charge for using already heavily overcharged and undersupplied roads. Given that a minority of road users create the majority of traffic congestion, a majority of road users would benefit from a rebalancing of road charges. Less congested and inter-urban roads would attract a lower charge (which would almost certainly be most efficiently collected through fuel and vehicle excise duties), while urban road users would pay a higher charge per km than at present.
The other attraction of treating road charges as regulated utility charges is that it provides the basis for financing investment. In the private sector, the assurance that an efficiently managed utility will be allowed to earn an adequate return on its investment allows the utility to borrow against its future revenues if current profits are insufficient to finance current investment. If the Government were to create an independent regulatory agency to set the level of road charges, then that same assurance for proper investment planning could be provided to the agency or agencies responsible for road investment. One can imagine a variety of such agencies -Roadtrack for strategic roads, and various agencies responsible for urban roads (such as Transport for London). A regulator, (Ofroad?) would also provide the reassurance that voting motorists need if they are to support any changes in the structure of road charges. Before that happens, though, a number of difficult regulatory and accounting issues would need to be resolved.
The first issue would be the choice of discount rate and the source of borrowing (and of the required return on the assets to pay to the State as owner). If the revenues really are guaranteed, then Roadtrack and its counterparts would be able to borrow at rather low real rates of interest. Risk would be low, and solvency assured for a public sector entity. If the Government attempted to restrict or delay investment, then the solvency of Roadtrack would increase, as revenues would rise in line with traffic (until revised down at the next periodic review), and the ability to invest would increase. That would argue for a rather high valuation of the opening RAB, so that a large fraction of revenue would be payable as a dividend to the State, to prevent surplus funds accumulating and leading to less responsible investment. A better solution might be for the regulator to monitor investment plans, as for other utilities.
The alternative is for the Government to specify a required rate of return comparable to that required by private transport investors (which included Railtrack before it was forced into administration by the Government). That would have the Diamond-Mirrlees logic of ensuring comparability between competing transport investments, but would require the Treasury to source the finance and charge an appropriate WACC (perhaps by requiring a specified gearing and dividend yield).
There is no simple solution to creating the right institutional structure for the management of road investment, but the model of the regulated network utility has obvious attractions. It has, with the exception of Railtrack, been a successful method of managing capital-intensive network monopolies, and ensuring that they deliver adequate levels of investment. Railtrack suffered from the inherent difficulty that railways are inevitably lossmaking. An independent regulator such as the Office of Rail Regulation risks continual confrontation with the Treasury if it requires higher charges to cover necessary investment. As private train operators are only viable with public subsidy, increased track charges feed through to demands for additional subsidies that will be resisted by the Treasury. Roadtrack if anything would be in the opposite situation of making embarrassing surpluses, with the regulator acting to restrain charges to avoid paying the Treasury excessive amounts. For our present purpose, though, we are more concerned with setting road charges than deciding how investment should be managed, and so these difficult institutional design issues can be sidestepped here. Eichenberger (2002) offers another perspective on the required institutional and political structure needed to deliver efficient investment.
4.
Efficient road prices Continuing with the useful benchmark of the regulated network utility, the aim is to ensure an efficient structure of prices for the various services such that their total yield is no greater than the regulated revenue cap. Economists wishing to analyse road congestion and road pricing have usually relied on link speed-flow relationships estimated by traffic engineers to compute marginal congestion costs (e.g. Newbery, 1988 Newbery, , 1990 . Figure 2 illustrates the traditional analysis of congestion externalities. Higher traffic flows lead to lower average speeds and higher travel times and costs per km. Additional traffic imposes an external cost on all other road users. Under congested conditions, particularly in urban areas, and in the absence of efficient road pricing, traffic will be undercharged and hence excessive. In Figure 2 , the average social cost (ASC) excludes road taxes, while the average private cost (APC) includes road taxes, CB. If the inverse demand is as shown, the equilibrium will occur at point C, where the marginal willingness to pay is equal to the APC. The efficient equilibrium is at point D, where the marginal social cost (MSC) is equal to the marginal willingness to pay. This would be supported by a congestion charge DE (which, as shown, would replace the poorly targeted road tax levied on fuel, CB). The inefficiency of incorrect pricing (the deadweight loss) is then measured by the area DCM.
One obvious objection to this link-flow approach is that observations of traffic flows on links may be a very poor guide to traffic conditions in densely meshed urban networks, where most traffic interactions and delays take place at intersections, not on the links between. This in turn casts doubt on estimates based on these measured simple speed-flow relationships. Fortunately, sophisticated traffic assignment models have been developed to simulate equilibrium traffic flows over a network. SATURN (Simulation and Assignment of Traffic to Urban Road Networks) is an example of such a software package which simulates the results of demands for trips specified by a matrix giving the number of trips between all origin and destination (O-D) pairs (Van Vliet and Hall, 1997) . SATURN finds the Wardrop equilibrium, defined as the assignment of traffic in which no trip-maker can reduce total trip cost (the value of the time taken and vehicle operating costs) by choosing a different route to that assigned. Newbery and Santos (2002) use this to compute area-wide counterparts to those shown in Fig. 2 .
There are, however, two major problems with this line of investigation, one conceptual and the other practical. The conceptual problem is that each segment of each trip will give rise to a different marginal congestion cost, and there is a problem of aggregation if this is to be represented as a single value, as in Fig. 2 . The practical problem is that (supposedly) first-best congestion charging for each link and intersection varying with the prevailing level of traffic is infeasible. It is currently technically impractical, and even if it became technically feasible, it would likely impose excessive information processing costs on drivers. As the aim is to discourage cost-ineffective trips, routes or times, any pricing signal will have to be sufficiently clear and simple to induce appropriate responses. Newbery and Santos (2002) show how to address the conceptual problem of aggregation by considering the optimal equi-proportional reduction in all O-D trips, for each of which there would then be associated a trip-specific (but not route-specific) charge, the average of which would be as shown. The deadweight loss (DWL) relative to this (secondbest) equilibrium would be accurately measured by the area DCM. While this approach has its advantages and allows a swift screening of towns to select candidates for practical road pricing schemes, the best equi-proportional traffic reduction would not be the most effective way to improve traffic efficiency, and would itself be hard to implement.
The practical problem of road pricing can be addressed by searching for a feasible set of instruments. The natural choice is a cordon toll, where vehicles are charged for crossing a cordon, typically enclosing the centre of the city. The charge can depend on the time of day and be possibly directional (for example, charging for entering in the morning peak and leaving during the evening peak). Cordon tolls have been implemented in Hong Kong, Singapore and three towns in Norway, and are under active study in Britain (May, Bonsall and Hills, 1998; Larsen and Ramjerdi, 1991; Menon, 2000) . The early cordon tolls were primarily set to raise revenue, in the case of Oslo to pay for the transport improvements that were part of the political deal (Larsen and Østmoe, 2001 ). As such they set charges that were frequently constant over the whole day, not charging more in the peak than off-peak, and not optimised to maximise social welfare. It is, at least to an economist, a natural step to require that the cordon tolls be optimally set, where the objective is social welfare, measured as the consumer benefit from travel, less the total social cost of that travel.
Designing an efficient cordon toll or tolls turns out to be very complex, and as yet essentially unsolved. The choice variables include the exact location of the cordon, the prices at each crossing point and at each time of day. The net social benefits after allowing for the quite considerable costs of installing and operating the cordon tolls, are sensitive to all of these (Larsen and Østmoe, 2001; May, Milne, Shepherd and Sumalee, 2002; Newbery and Santos, 2002) . The problem is one of complexity -even in a small town the number of possible locations rises exponentially with the number of links. A typical cordon may have 5-15 crossings, and the scheme can yield higher benefits if the charges are varied across these crossings (by up to 40% more compared to finding the optimum uniform toll). Adjusting tolls by time-of-day makes sense to avoid bunching of traffic just before the start and to encourage efficient time-switching, but raises the complexity by a further order of magnitude. For example, Larsen and Østmoe, (2001) show that dropping the (already time-of-day differentiated) toll on Saturday increases consumer surplus by 40%. To date all estimates of the correct level of toll and the resulting benefits are based on assumed traffic flow relationships and behavioural responses, either or both of which could be wrong. It will clearly be important to monitor the performance and responses to practical schemes to validate the calculations and allow tolls to be adjusted. 6 Finally, there is no available evidence about the longer-run land-use impacts of cordon tolls, and given that cordon tolls are second or third-best, there are no useful theorems that ensure that these land-use impacts will be efficient if the tolls are optimally adjusted to achieve short-run efficiency. Eliasson and Mattson (2001) show that in a simulated and symmetric city the land-use effects of link-based road-pricing are small compared to traffic impacts, and they cite a small number of other studies that also suggest small effects. If spatial distortion costs are large and the impacts are long-lasting, small locational changes could still produce significant costs or benefits.
If the problem of optimising the design of cordon tolls appears daunting, it does not follow that such schemes are not worth implementing. In their study of road pricing for eight British towns, Santos, Newbery and Rojey (2001) found that the predicted benefits of optimal uniform cordon tolls considerably exceeded the costs of implementation in most cases, providing that the tolls were set correctly. The same appears to be true in Oslo (Larsen and Østmoe, 2001) . Detailed investigation of Cambridge suggested that the location of the cordon made a considerable difference, and as a simple rule, maximising the ratio of traffic terminating within the zone to that passing through (before the toll) increased the benefit-cost ratio. Other studies suggest that additional tolling of particularly congested isolated links can enhance benefits, as can combining cordon tolls with distance charges (though this is likely to require more sophisticated equipment). One major argument for conducting simple road pricing trials (such as time-of-day cordon tolls) is to test the models that predict driver response and traffic improvement against the reality, as well as to test their political acceptability. Refinements and improvements are likely to be simpler once the principle has been adequately tested.
4.1
Integrating local road pricing into a system of road charging Suppose that initial experiments with local area road pricing such as cordon tolls are successful, what would this imply for the overall design of road charges? Suppose also that total road charge revenue is capped and regulated, so any road pricing scheme that generates additional revenue will be associated with reductions in fuel and/or vehicle excise duties (VED). This helps to ensure that road pricing commands sufficient voter support. In that case urban road pricing schemes can be introduced wherever its is sufficiently cost-effective. Each selected town would have a compatible form of electronic charging, and all road vehicles would be equipped with the appropriate transponders to register these charges in whatever town they passed through.
7 As a starting point, road fuel taxes would then be set to cover the average long-run marginal cost of inter-urban roads for typical cars, with VED set to adjust total payments by typical vehicles in each size class to the costs they impose on inter-urban roads. Ideally urban road prices would recover the remaining revenue.
As most practical forms of road pricing like cordon tolls would only charge for part of the congested area, and as the net social benefits of tolls are sensitive to the level of the toll, there is no guarantee that the revenue collected will be the required amount. If road fuel taxes and VED are set correctly for inter and non-urban roads, and if the road supply costs are not very much higher in urban areas, then these taxes alone would collect about the right total amount (because fuel efficiency is lower in urban congested areas). Additional road charges would risk exceeding the allowed revenue. If these taxes are set correctly just for inter-urban roads that are currently heavily used, they may not adequately cover the costs of lightly used rural roads, and the surplus from urban areas might balance out the short-fall from the nonstrategic rural roads. Again, if the marginal cost of capacity expansion is very high in urban areas, the required urban revenue per vehicle km may need to be substantially larger than from inter-urban roads, and the road charges may help make up the shortfall.
In any case, the difference between the allowed or regulated revenue and that collected from the initial set of fuel taxes, VED, and road prices, either positive or negative, would then be collected from or returned to road users in the least distortionary way. This could be done by adjusting fuel taxes and VED. As a general rule, adjusting the fixed element, or VED, is likely to be more efficient. If there is a shortfall, increases in the VED would be regressive. Increasing the charge on fuel in practice means lowering current rates by less as road pricing is introduced, and is clearly simpler, and more in line with willingness to pay for the public good of the road network. If the charges need to be reduced, then some reduction in VED may be attractive, though there is a limit to how much can be returned while retaining the ability to adjust total charges by vehicle class.
There is a significant practical transition problem of introducing urban road prices one town at a time (as is the plan in Britain). In the early years, the road prices would only cover a small fraction of the total vehicle fleet. If all road users continue to pay the old road taxes but some face additional road prices, they will be effectively overcharged and will surely resist the new road prices. Ideally, the revenue from the new road prices would be recycled to the set of road users affected in a non-distortionary way. Practical and politically acceptable schemes might provide transfers to car owners living within the political jurisdiction of the charging authority. The first priority would be to provide any metering equipment for free and provide it with a certain initial level of credit. Road improvements that directly benefit road users are an attractive solution that worked well in Oslo, but will not always be available. Providing car-parking vouchers where these are charged, or credits against annual license fees may exhaust the remaining credits. As road pricing becomes more prevalent, fuel taxes can be lowered and VED raised, so that the discounts against VED will be targeted on those facing road prices. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the design of such transitional arrangements, which are likely to be critical for the public acceptability of road pricing.
5.
Charging for other external costs Efficiency requires that road users pay the marginal external cost (for noise, pollution, accidents, etc) that they impose of society. Again, the limited number of instruments available limits the usefulness of this textbook prescription. Logically, the first task is to identify and quantify the external costs, then to establish the functional relationship between these costs and road (or fuel) use, and finally set the available taxes or controls at optimal levels. Note that this approach is potentially different from the requirement that road users pay the total amount of any social costs, unless coincidentally, the marginal and average external costs are equal, i.e. damage is a linear function of road use.
Some environmental impacts may be very non-linear; in which case the marginal cost will be very different from the average. Noise pollution is a good example where the marginal cost is below the average cost -doubling noise levels has the same perceived nuisance cost at low and high levels (provided the levels remain below the threshold of physical damage). Increasing the number of cars on a quiet road from 9 to 10 per hour creates the same nuisance as increasing the number of vehicles from 900 to 1000 per hour on a busy main road. Thus the marginal noise cost of an extra vehicle in the second case is only 1% of the extra vehicle on a quiet road where traffic is only 1% of the level.
5.1
Accident costs The number of road fatalities in Britain 2000 was 3,409, of which 997 were pedestrians, cyclists or bus passengers. In addition, a further 38,000 people were seriously injured. The Department for Transport estimates the total cost of all road accidents as £17 billion, of which the "human costs " that reflect willingness to pay to avoid the loss of life or injury amount to about half (Department for Transport, 2002) . Some fraction will be an internal cost to the person causing the accident. The average fatal accident caused 1.1 fatalities, 0.41 serious casualties, and 0.5 slight casualties, so if the person causing the fatal accident were killed, the self-inflicted cost would be 87% of the total. Seventeen percent of fatal accidents involved only one car, and presumably created no external cost (other than grief to friends and relatives). Some costs (e.g. to property, which accounted for £5.2 billion) are likely to have been covered by insurance and reflected in insurance premia. Other costs are borne by the state (Health Service, police, etc) and are included in the current estimates of the road costs. The remaining costs are external costs visited upon other road users, some very asymmetrically, such as to pedestrians and cyclists. Some external costs are not recorded, and of these the consequential traffic congestion and delays may be appreciable (Arnott, 2002) ..
The next question is whether road users should be charged for external accident costs, or whether they are better dealt with in some other way (through the criminal justice system or by strict liability and insurance). Where the fault can be proven to lie with the motorist, then penalties or compensation seem appropriate, although there are obvious problems in compensating for death. Logically, the value of a life (£1.44 million in Britain in 2000) should be payable (by the insurance company) to the estate of the victim, though this does not appear to happen. The practical question is what fraction of external costs are not reflected in insurance costs, and of how much should be related to distance driven (and weight of vehicle, via fuel taxes).
If, as with other elements of road charging, the aim is to influence behaviour (cause motorists to take proper care), then the question to ask is what is the extra external accident cost per km driven (which is likely to vary with type of vehicle, location, and time of day). As with noise pollution, it is important to distinguish between average and marginal cost. In 1985, 5,165 road users were killed on the roads of Great Britain (DoT, 1996, p84) , equal to 16.68 per thousand million vehicle km. Ten years later, in 1995, 3,621 road users were killed, or 8.40 per thousand million vehicle km, almost half the 1985 rate despite a nearly 40% increase in traffic.
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Increases in traffic do not seem to lead to increased numbers of accidents in total, though of course many factors are responsible for the considerable fall in the accident rate. More traffic lights, better vehicle and road design, more use of seat belts and safety bags, better campaigns and more stringent enforcement against drinking and driving, and perhaps even slower speeds associated with more congestion have no doubt all contributed to greater road safety.
One less obvious factor is drivers' response to perceived risk -if roads seem more dangerous, drivers take more care, balancing the need to travel quickly against the desire to arrive in one piece. If so, more traffic on the roads makes overtaking and other potentially dangerous manoeuvres less attractive and less frequent, keeping down the total number of accidents even though vehicle km driven increases. If this is indeed the case, then the marginal social cost of the increased risk of accident facing other road users as a result of an extra vehicle will be much lower than the average social cost of accidents.
Of course, the total social cost of loss of accidents is still huge -at £16 billion per year it amounts to more than half of total road taxes of £28 billion. The average accident cost of road fatalities on this estimate would be 3.4p/km or 33p/litre, 9 but the marginal external distance-related accident cost might be zero.
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If all the non-motorist costs (excluding property damage) and attributed to motorists, the figure would be £3 billion per 8 The number of serious injuries dropped even more. From 1995 to 2000, accident rates for cars have declined by a further 10% (DTLR, 2001 , table 1.6). 9 Expressing the cost per litre allocates accidents more in proportion to vehicle weight, which is likely to be more accurately targeted. 10 Of course the issue is more complex, for there is some cost in having to take more care as a result of the greater perceived risk, and this should be included. The fact that children are not allowed to play in streets and are driven to school rather than walking lowers the child accident rate but has a social cost. Although motorists may be better at avoiding killing each other, they are still killing cyclists and pedestrians at an alarming rate: the ratio of cyclists killed or seriously injured per million km travelled to that of car occupants rose from 14.6 in 1984 to 21.6 in 1994 (DoT, 1996, p13) while for pedestrians it rose from 11.2 to 14.6. (That is, in 1994 the risk of being killed or seriously injured per km travelled on a cycle was 21.6 times that in a car.) Improvements in road safety are therefore benefiting cars more than cyclists or pedestrians, though the accident rate (killed or seriously injured per km travelled) has fallen for all -by 5.8% per year for car occupants, 1.5% per year for cyclists and 3.3% per year for pedestrians. year or 6p/litre. If the likelihood of such accidents increases less than in proportion to traffic, only some fraction of this is attributable, while penalties and insurance costs might reduce this further. Finally, safety standards such as airbags, survivability, etc, increase the cost of driving and provide additional internalisation of risk. There are further complications discussed by Newbery (1988) and Lindberg (2001) in allowing for the external costs to nonprotected (or poorly protected) road users (like pedestrians and cyclists), and possibly allowing for the suffering to friends and relatives (that according to Lindberg might add a further 36% to total costs).
Lindberg (2001) summarises the present state of theory and evidence. Accidents are proportional to traffic on inter-urban roads and urban links, but increase with traffic at intersections (giving rise to a positive externality as the risk elasticity is between 0.25 and 0.45). Surprisingly, the risk of an accident with a non-protected road user decreases with traffic, and the risk elasticity is estimated to be -0.5. Lindberg estimates the marginal external cost in Sweden as 12% of the average cost for non-urban cars, 33% for urban cars, 33% for heavy nonurban vehicles and 40% for heavy urban vehicles, though some part of these marginal costs will be paid through insurance. For cars, the external cost would justify a charge of 0.14 Euro/litre non-urban, 0.35 Euro/litre urban. If these figures are translated applied to Britain, the total charge would be £6 billion, but the accident rate is somewhat higher in Sweden. The figure seems high compared with the total cost to non-protected victims of £3 billion. Newbery (1988) estimated accident externalities at perhaps 25p/litre for cars (for 1985 when the accident rate was more than twice the 2000 figure, and using costs of accidents slightly higher in £ than those used above). This estimate was based on very sketchy information about the risk elasticity, which was taken as 0.25. Halving the cost to reflect the fall in the accident rate would make it similar to Lindberg's estimate.
The conclusion is that accident externalities might be appreciable, but the appropriate level of charges might be considerably reduced if punishment and insurance charges already induce sufficient care. In the absence of convincing calibrated research accident costs will not be added to the total road user costs, though their value is given in Table 2 below. 
5.2
Implications of paying for environmental damage The idea that road users (and others) should pay for environmental damage has far-reaching implications. To an economist, the obvious way in which road users should pay is through the tax system, as the environment is held in trust for all -there is no obvious owner to whom payments should be made other than the state acting as custodian. Taxes are not the only way, and indeed, the idea of levying environmental (or 'green') taxes is a fairly novel concept in Britain. The normal way in which polluters have in the past paid is by being forced to undertake otherwise unattractive expenditures to meet mandated standards of quality. The most obvious example in transport is the vehicle emission standards that are set by the government for new vehicles. These require catalytic converters and/or more expensive electronic ignition, and improved fuel but have reduced particular emissions per km by between one half and threequarters since 1993 (DTLR, 2001, Table 2.6). There are also a host of regulations about noise levels, safety standards (alcohol levels, vehicle lights, seat-belts, road worthiness, etc) designed to control the impact vehicles have on the environment and other road users (some literally). However, using 'green' taxes, in addition to various standards, has a number of economic advantages and political attractions.
The political attraction of 'green' taxes is clear -they are likely to command more support than other kinds of taxes. The main economic advantage of taxes that reflect the marginal damage is that it leaves the user to decide how best to respond, rather than forcing him or her to make one particular kind of decision. It also is more accurately targeted to the damage caused, and therefore likely to be more effective at lower cost. Perhaps the best-known example is the higher tax on leaded rather than unleaded petrol (gasoline). In 1993, 63% of British motorists bought unleaded petrol, compared to only 5% who bought unleaded petrol in 1988. Forcing all motorists to switch to unleaded petrol would have required major premature scrapping of older vehicles, and would not have been politically acceptable. Just requiring new vehicles to be able to run on unleaded petrol would have discouraged the replacement of older vehicles, as the newer ones would require more expensive engines. Nor would it have provided any incentive to actually buy unleaded petrol. Discouraging replacement would have had a perverse effect on pollution, while not encouraging a fuel switch would lead to a smaller reduction than was possible.
If 'green' taxes are to be both politically attractive and economically effective, they must be clearly distinguished from other taxes or charges, set at levels determined by acceptable methods of computing the cost of the damage done, and applied uniformly to all sources of the same damage. That is, environmental taxes should be distinct, non-discriminatory, and defensibly quantified. These criteria pose considerable challenges and if applied would have radical consequences for fuel taxes more generally.
The principle that environmental taxes should be distinct carries particular force as it virtually requires that other road taxes be treated as regulated charges for using road space. It forms part of the political compact with road users justifying the total level of taxes, and specifically any changes in those taxes.
5.3
Non-discriminatory environmental taxes Suppose that the Government reviews road taxation and reforms the system to distinguish road charges from other forms of taxation, allowing for a separate category of 'green' or environmental taxes, which charge for the environmental damage caused by road users. Unless these taxes were applied in a non-discriminatory way, the full benefits to the environment would not be realised, as well as undermining the justification for imposing environmental taxes on transport. Let us take three simple examples of transport air pollutants -greenhouse gases (GHG), mainly carbon dioxide or CO 2 , the main cause of global warming, nitrogen oxides or NO x , a precursor of acid rain, and particulates, PM 10 , which cause increased mortality. Fig. 3 shows the share of road transport in the total production of these (and other) air pollutants in 1999. Clearly, road transport is a major contributor to the total emissions of these three pollutants (and also for volatile organic compounds, or VOCs, though not of sulphur dioxide, SO 2 , the other main cause of acid rain). However, except for carbon monoxide, CO, road transport causes less than half the UK's emissions, and in the case of GHG, singled out as the reason for fuel tax increases, only 22% of the total (though one of the fastest growing components).
It follows that to tax only transport emissions would involve a very partial and discriminatory environmental tax policy. Carbon taxes have been advocated as one of the simplest forms of green taxation, for they can be imposed very precisely on the source of the problem -the carbon content of the fuel, which is easily measured and completely defines the damaging potential of the CO 2 . Such carbon taxes have been proposed by the EU, but were soundly rejected by the Trade and Industry Committee of the House of Commons when they came to examine the market for coal, as being likely to accelerate the decline of the British coal industry. Since then the Conservative Government was defeated in its attempt to raise VAT on domestic energy from 8% to the standard rate of 17.5%, while the new Labour Government actually reduced the rate to 5%, thus effectively subsidising domestic gas and electricity use by 12.5%. They then introduced a Climate Change Levy on all forms of electricity generation except renewables, thus taxing non-GHG emitting nuclear electricity, and taxing electricity generated by low carbon containing gas at the same rate per kWh as the considerably higher carbon content of coal and oil-fired generation. Again, domestic customers were exempted.
British tax policy towards greenhouse gases is thus in a state of disarray. To put the imbalance in the treatment of different fuels in perspective, until recently the British Government raised the excise tax on road fuels each year by 5% above the rate of inflation. The annual increase of about 3p/litre amounts to £47 or US$75/tonne carbon, or nearly $10/barrel, which was the original suggested total EU carbon tax (and only half was to be on the carbon content of the fuel, the rest being on the energy content).
Figure 3 Sources of Air Pollution UK 1999
Matters are perhaps slightly more even handed with NO x , for the power generation and industrial sectors are subject to emission limits which force them to install improved combustion controls or catalytic converters, much as is the case with vehicles (though the cost effectiveness of reducing NO x emissions from stationary sources is considerably higher than for small mobile sources such as vehicles). The same is true for particulates, though for the wrong reason -they are not subject to much control, except from large combustion sources. If environmental taxes are to be employed as part of a decentralised market-friendly environmental policy, then some of these more obvious imbalances across fuels and sectors will have to be addressed for this element of the total road charge to be defensible.
5.4
Quantifying the size of the environmental costs of transport If environmental taxes are to be justified as correcting externalities, these will have to be quantified. Where the environmental damage can be measured, valued, and attributed to particular causes, then the principle is clear -set the tax equal to the marginal cost of the damage caused, and levy it in a way that gives the clearest signals to the polluter responsible. The results of the analysis below are summarised in Table 2 , and their implications for tax rates in Table 3 .
Global warming
The only pollutant that is simply related to fuel consumption is CO 2 , where there is a direct relationship between fuel used and damage done. The logical tax is a carbon tax on all carboncontaining fuels. Determining the correct level is highly contentious, and the answer depends on the precise question asked, quite apart from any difficulty in quantifying the damage done. Is the tax to be set equal to the global marginal damage on the assumption that all countries impose the same tax, or at the global marginal damage on the best prediction about what other countries may do (but still unselfishly counting all the damage done not just to the UK but the rest of the world), or is it the marginal damage to the UK, based on some view of the response function of other countries to our choice of tax rate? The three answers are likely to be very different.
Even if we agree on the question, there are wide differences between various estimates. Maddison et al (1995) estimated the shadow prices of controlling the last unit of carbon dioxide released assuming optimal abatement, where the marginal cost is $(1993) 5.9/tonne carbon (tC). This is only slightly less than the cost assuming 'Business as Usual', calculated as $6.1/tC. ECMT (1998, p. 70) cites estimates ranging from $2-$10/tC , considerably below the EU's original proposed carbon tax discussed above. Tol et al. (2000) reviews various estimates and argues for marginal damage costs below $50/tC. The UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions decided in early 2001 to take as their working assumption a central estimate of $80/tC, with a range from $40-$160. British road transport emissions were 36 million tC in 2000, implying a cost of £0.9-3.6 billion. It is worth noting that a carbon tax of $80/tC would amount to $53/tonne of coal, or rather more than 100% of the international price. The Danish carbon tax introduced in 1992 was at a rate of 100DKK/tonne CO 2 or $38/tC, while Finland levied a carbon tax of all energy at about 500 FMK/tC or $70/tC, roughly twice as high. Parry and Small (2001) review the literature and select a central figure of $25/tC, with range $0.7-100/tC.
Even this modest range of citations suggests a range of almost 100:1, with preferred estimates differing perhaps by 10:1. However, even the high figure represents a small fraction of existing road fuel tax rates. There are 0.64tC/mt gasoline (0.87tC/'000litres), so a carbon tax of $80/tC would be 7UScents/litre, about 0.7 cents/km, or less than 10% of the 2000 UK gasoline excise tax. While carbon taxes are potentially of central importance for other fuels, they are relatively small compared to EU road fuel excises.
The health costs of vehicle emissions
The transport pollutants that are most damaging to health are particulates, NO x , lead, and SO 2 (though not in most developed countries where transport fuel has very low levels of sulphur). In most developed countries tailpipe emission standards on new vehicles have resulted in a dramatic reduction in total levels of road transport emissions, despite the continuing increase in traffic. Newbery (1998a) argues for estimating the social costs of the health effects of pollution by estimating the number of quality adjusted life years (QALYs) lost through premature mortality and morbidity. These costs should then be compared with what it costs the taxpayer to enable the National Health Service (in the UK or its counterpart in other countries) to achieve an extra year of quality life. The numbers used in the evaluation of transport should be consistent with numbers used elsewhere in health economics. This would enable the money raised in green taxes (which are mainly the costs of health damage) to be allocated to the National Health Service, which should be able to compensate for the quality life years lost through pollution by an equal saving of quality life years gained from improved health services.
Recent work presented at a UN/ECE symposium The measurement and economic valuation of the health effects of air pollution, London, Feb 19-20, 2001 suggests an encouraging convergence in estimates of the mortality effects of the more damaging pollutants.
12 Severe urban pollution reduces life expectancy, and a permanent increase in air pollution of 10 :g/m 3 of PM 10 is estimated to raise the daily mortality rate by 1%. That in turn would reduce average life expectancy in Britain by 34 days (weighted by the British age distribution and based on current age-specific mortality rates). In order to relate the loss of QALYs to the annual consumption of fuel, the correct calculation is the total loss of QALYs for a one-year increase in emissions, leaving future mortality rates at the zero emission level. Appendix A shows that road transport may be responsible for 4.4:g/m 3 of PM 10 in Britain, reducing the loss of life-expectancy per person exposed to 0.21 days per year of exposure. If we err on the high side and suppose that QALYs do not decrease with age (as they do), and take the exposed population as all 58 million people, the total number of QALYs lost by one year's traffic particulate emissions is 34,000.
The UK Department for Transport assumes a value of a statistical life saved (VoSLS) in traffic accidents as £1.44 million. The weighted average age of a traffic accident if all are equally exposed is 38, and life expectancy is then 40 years. We can therefore take a statistical life as 40 QALYs, making the value of a QALY as £36,000. The UK National Institute of Clinical Excellence was reported (Times, 10 Aug, 2001) as tentatively accepting a figure of £30,000 per QALY, suggesting a convergence on the valuation side. At £36,000/QALY, the cost of traffic pollution is £1.2 billion/yr, negligible compared with road taxation of £27.5 billion in 2000/01 (excluding all VAT). This raises several interesting issues. For example, do we equate the 34,000 QALYs above with 850 statistical lives, and if so does this mean that traffic pollution is 25% as serious as traffic fatalities, of which there were 3,409? One is inclined to think that pollution, which may reduce the life expectancy of a large number of people by a very small amount, is less socially costly than traffic accidents, which reduce the life expectancy of a small number of people by a large amount. If so, then the value of a QALY used above may overstate the pollution cost.
Earlier estimates in Newbery (1998a) suggested a range of values for total air pollution costs of £0.6-3.6 billion, on average rather higher than here, but these pre-dated the UN/ECE evidence, and the ability to make the detailed calculations shown in Appendix A. Most (89% in Britain) of this cost is attributable to diesel vehicles, and would amount to 5.6p/litre of diesel (or 0.9p/km), and 0.45p/litre of petrol (or 0.04p/km). Note that for pre-1993 vehicles the particulate tax should be 40-50% higher than this average value, and for post-1997 vehicles 50-80% lower (with diesel cars experiencing the greater improvement). These figures do not include the cost of morbidity (which is not likely to be a large fraction of mortality costs), nor do they include other health costs attributable to other pollutants (that are also likely to be modest compared to particulate mortality costs).
This figure can be contrasted with the estimates from McCubbin and Delucchi, (1999) for the U.S. where the range for light (i.e. gasoline-powered) vehicles is 0.6-7.7 US (1990) cents/mile. This would be 0.5-6.8 US (2000) cents/km, and higher if all vehicles were included. Parry and Small (2001) select a central figure of 1.3 US cents/km with a range from 0.3-6.3 cents/km, again for light vehicles. Again, these figures seem on the high side given the recent downgrading of the health costs of transport pollution based on more careful assessments of effect on mortality rates.
The costs of other emissions are modest, and presented in Table 2 . They are taken from Newbery (1998a) without further analysis, though the allocation across fuels in Table 3 is based on data from DTLR (2001). Maddison et. al. (1996) give higher values but they appear to be double counting particulates, as they distinguish between direct (from mainly carbon in exhausts) and indirect (caused by nitrates and sulphates derived from NO x and SO 2 emissions). Our figures are derived from measured concentrations of particulates, presumably from all sources.
Noise
Noise relationships are extremely non-linear and it is therefore dangerous to compute the total cost of noise and then apportion it to vehicles, as in Tinch (1995) . 13 The approach adopted here is to take the traffic noise functions from DoT (1988) and compute the extra noise arising from additional vehicles of different types on different roads. The details are given in Appendix B. The intriguing feature of the noise relationship is the claim that noise costs are linear in decibels (more precisely, dB(A)), which are a logarithmic measure of noise intensity. Consequently a 1% reduction in traffic on a distant motorway is as valuable to those affected as a 1% fall in traffic on a busy city street or a leafy suburb, for someone sitting outdoors facing the road, or inside their double-glazed house. It follows that concentrating traffic on busy roads (like the M25) reduces total noise damage, for transferring half the traffic on a minor road to a motorway might only increase traffic there by 5%, reducing the cost of noise by 45%. Newbery (1998a) estimates the average marginal cost of noise pollution at 0.2-0.36p/km. The allocation across fuels in Table 3 reflects the higher noise nuisance of heavier (diesel) vehicles.
Water pollution
Run-off from highways places a considerable load on sewage systems, and a considerable part of that is directly attributable to road traffic. The UK figure for this source of water pollution is 15% of the total cost of sewage treatment, estimated in 1995/96 as  £3 billion per year. The marginal cost could be lower, though the capital value of the water infrastructure used to determine costs greatly understates their replacement value, so the long-run marginal costs of total sewage handling would be higher, perhaps as high as £8.9 billion. Some part of highway run-off would take place regardless of traffic, though the extra foul water caused by vehicles puts additional stress on sewage treatment. Newbery (1998a) takes these figures to give a range from £0.5-£1 billion per year or 0.1-0.2p/km, while Delucchi (1997) estimates costs of 0.05-0.13p/km, which are similar.
5.4
Charging for environmental damage Tables 2 and 3 collect together the various estimates of costs and express them in charges per km or per litre of fuel. In some cases the costs correlate more closely with fuel than distance (particularly for emissions). Sources: Tables 1 and 2 , and DTLR(2001) .
Pollution damage also varies widely across different vehicles of the same type, raising the question what form of averaging is appropriate. Fairness (and political support) suggests that the level of charges should not be such that most transport users pay more than the damage done, and that suggests setting any taxes at the rate appropriate for the median vehicle user, which may be about half the average level.
14 What then to do with those who greatly exceed this representative level of damage? There are two possibilities -one is to impose extra charges (or offer rebates to those who meet the standards of lower emissions), and the other is to set standards with penalties for exceeding them.
The main problem with all transport pollution taxes is that the link between cause and effect is not very close. Most of the damage is done as a consequence of emissions, and hence related to distance and fuel use, but the damage per litre of fuel varies widely across vehicle types and ages. The only current instrument which can be adjusted to the type of vehicle is the VED, which is a fixed charge, independent of distance. VED rebates to lorries have been used to encourage the use of low emission technology, so the principle has been accepted in the UK at least. The problem is that high fixed charges and low variable charges encourage higher mileage and hence more emissions than the correct vehicle specific variable charges. VED rates for cars and light vehicles for vehicles first registered after 2001 are differentiated by CO 2 emissions (g/km) and fuel type, which seems perverse given the greater suitability of fuel as the base of a straight carbon tax. Parry and Small (2001) argue that emissions damage is proportional to distance driven, rather than fuel consumption, as emissions standard are set in grams/km driven, not grams/litre of fuel. Higher fuel taxes lead to a reduction in distance driven and an increase in fuel efficiency (largely through vehicle choice), with the two effects contributing roughly equally. Taxing fuel is therefore rather an inefficient way of taxing for distance travelled, and hence a doubly indirect instrument for pollution damage (except for carbon taxes). This argument ignores the greater emissions per km of heavier vehicles, and simple calculations show that emissions per litre are more stable across vehicle types than emissions per km. Taxes per litre are simpler than charges per km, although the Swiss government imposes distance (and vehicle-specific) charges for heavy vehicles (Suter and Walter, 2001) . Santos and Newbery (2001) , reporting results from Santos, Rojey and Newbery (2000) , examine the effect of cordon charges on pollution, and find an extremely close relationship between the congestion and environmental benefits of cordons, at least up to the optimal level of the cordon. Their paper examines eight different pollutants -carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds (VOC), nitrogen oxides (NO x ), particulates (PM), methane (CH 4 ), nitrous oxide (N 2 O) and amonia (CH 3 ), though only health impacts and global warming effects were valued in the cost analysis. They also found that environmental benefits were a small fraction of the congestion benefits (typically between 1-9% across towns and taking a wide range of values for the costs of emissions, with the high value considerably above those defended above).
If road pricing is introduced, then the road charging system can be adapted to levy vehicle-specific charges, but until then any pollution taxes will be relatively crude. It follows that other instruments are likely to be needed as well. Such methods will probably include setting emission standards not just for new vehicles, but also for existing vehicles, with spot checks for enforcement and fines for exceedence (perhaps continuing on a daily basis until an emissions test indicates that the underlying problem has been addressed). Other solutions might be to only licence polluting vehicles for rural use, or to ban vehicles that lack a 'green' licence plate from entering large urban areas on days of high pollution. In windy developed northern cities such complex solutions are unlikely to be cost-effective.
Accident externalities are even more problematic (Calthrop and Proost, 1998; Jansson, 1994; Johansson, 1997; Newbery, 1988; Lindberg, 2001) . The relationship between distance travelled and accident rate is not well understood, nor do we know how those who are involved in accidents might respond to various disincentives. Taxing fuel is indirect, though it may partially capture the higher external costs of heavier vehicles, which transfer more of the impact to lighter vehicles, but it fails to deal with variations across drivers. The approach consistent with internalising externalities would be an ad valorem tax on the component of car insurance that covers accident costs (as opposed to theft, etc). Elsewhere such ideas have been criticised as encouraging drivers to avoid taking out insurance.
6.
Optimal tax arguments for additional road user taxes The theory of optimal taxation sets out conditions under which commodity tax rates should be uniform, in which case there would be no case for differential commodity taxes. These conditions are stringent but in many cases difficult to reject empirically. (Deaton, 1987) . If there is an optimal non-linear income tax, individuals differ only in the wage rate, and the direct utility function u(.) has goods, x, weakly separable from labour, L, (so u(x, L) = u{N(x) , L}), then optimal indirect taxes are uniform. (Mirrlees, 1979; Stern, 1987) .
Weaker conditions not assuming optimal income taxation apply with linear Engel curves and weak separability between leisure and goods (Deaton and Stern, 1985) . The argument that separability removes the case for differential commodity taxation is that in such cases the only determinant of the supply of labour is the cost of goods consumed, and this is minimised when relative prices are undisturbed. The case for differential commodity taxes therefore requires that separability breaks down, in which case there is an argument for more heavily taxing goods that are complementary with leisure (Corlett and Hague, 1953) . Parry and Small (2001) uses this argument to identify the "Ramsey" tax element or the additional taxation justified by the impact of road user charges on labour supply. They argue that if leisure is weakly separable in utility then personal travel is a relatively weak substitute for leisure if the expenditure elasticity for distance travelled is less than one (which, in developed countries, is normally the case). That provides a case for relatively higher taxes on travel, but there is an additional effect to consider. Congestion increases the costs of travel to work and road prices that reduce congestion therefore increase labour supply and hence reduce the distortionary costs of labour taxation. It follows that there is an additional benefit from reducing congestion over and above the pure efficiency effect, justifying yet more gasoline taxation. If diesel is primarily used for commercial purposes, then there would be no comparable case for additional diesel taxes. Parry and Small (2001) estimate that the Ramsey component of the optimal gasoline tax would be 6-7 US cents/litre and the congestion feedback as 0.3-2 cents/litre (the low figure for the US, the high figure for the UK). Together they amount to about one quarter of the optimal gasoline tax rate. These estimates ignore redistributional effects, which raises serious problems, at least in developed countries, as fuel consumption is relatively income inelastic. Optimal commodity taxes that may score well on efficiency grounds may do poorly on equity grounds, and in some cases the effects almost entirely cancel out. Meyers (1999) examines distributional considerations in an Applied General Equilibrium model of transport in Belgium and finds that if extra fuel tax revenue is used to reduce labour taxes, then, as expected, the rich benefit. On the other hand, recycling fuel tax revenue through lump sum transfers reduces this effect, and that is the relevant comparison for an optimally designed tax system, where marginal adjustments should be made to the lump sum element. Much depends on how the government sets taxes, and optimal tax theorists may be placing unjustifiable confidence in the Benthamite credentials of the finance minister.
There is a related literature arguing that corrective taxes (such as environmental taxes) need to take account of distortions elsewhere in the economy (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996) . Newbery (1992) argues that if fuel taxes are used to charge for road use and congestion, then total road taxes should rise by more (perhaps 20% more) than the pure carbon tax, as the carbon tax will induce greater fuel efficiency and hence reduce the tax base on which the road charges are set. Parry and Small (2001) make a similar point, though they estimate rather larger effects. As we have argued that the environmental component of taxes is modest, these corrections are less important. Table 3 shows that justifiable road user charges for Britain in 2000 are 2.6p/km. This translates into 2.1p/PCUkm (PCU = passenger car units, the appropriate measure of road space demands and congestive effects). This is equivalent to 25p/litre of fuel, although it would be more appropriate to relate this more accurately to vehicle type (and hence fuel) and rely on VED to improve cost-targeting. Other externalities (ignoring accidents) were estimated at 0.7-1.9p/km with a preferred value of 1.2p/km. Allocating this by fuel would justify green taxes of 11p/litre on petrol and 15p/litre on diesel. These might be somewhat reduced to reflect lower emissions from post 1997 vehicles if higher VED rates on older vehicles were imposed in compensation. Accident externalities might add as much as 13p/litre, though our (weakly) preferred rate is 3p/litre. Parry and Small (2001) estimate these as 21cents/US gallon or about 4p/litre, with the accident component about the same size. 'Green' taxes might therefore increase road charges by 45% on average. The pure road charge and green tax elements would amount to 36p/litre for petrol and 40p/litre for diesel (Euro 0.6/litre and 0.67.litre respectively) in Britain. If this applied generally across the EU, The Netherlands would be taxing gasoline at about the right rate, and all countries to the right in Fig. 1 would be overcharging gasoline (though with the exception of the UK, all are probably undercharging diesel).
Assessment
The most controversial element is the 'optimal tax' component, whose value depends sensitively on preferences (specifically, the various elasticities that are hard to measure), the tax instruments available (road prices vs fuel taxes, optimal income taxes vs proportional labour taxes), and the social welfare function (attitudes to inequality). In practical terms, ministers of finance in Britain, Germany and The Netherlands attempting to justify their current excessive gasoline tax rates might appeal to such arguments (indirectly, by arguing that they are necessary to finance public services such as health and education). It seems doubtful that the US Congress would pay much heed to such arguments, given that the rest of the tax system is hardly a model of the relentless application of Benthamite social welfare optimisation.
More to the point, the spirit of building up a defensible cost-based charging structure for road use, combined with general green taxes that apply equally to all pollutants, is contrary to an approach that singles out road use for delicate optimal tax adjustments. Given that the additional tax that might be justified is only a further 30% on top of the road charge and green element, and given the large uncertainties about almost all components of the total, it is difficult to accept that the modest social welfare benefits of such corrective taxes are worth sacrificing the clarity of the approach advocated here.
Arguably the most important aspect of a systematic approach to designing road charges is the philosophy of regulating total revenue, which encourages revenue-neutral adjustments to improve efficiency by shifting over to better targeted congestion taxes like cordon tolls and road pricing. Perhaps even more important, once the revenue stream is identified and subject to independent economic regulation, road finance can be put on a sound footing, with even larger potential improvements in transport and economic efficiency (Newbery, 1998a (Newbery, , 1998b .
Appendix A The health costs of vehicle particulate emissions
The most damaging vehicle emissions are particulates, usually measured by PM 10 , and mainly produced by diesel vehicles. Emissions increase the risk of mortality. The hazard rate, h, (the "force of mortality") can be estimated from the number of deaths, d, of people of a given age, divided by the mid-year population of that cohort, m, so that h = d/m (Miller and Hurley, 2002) . The probability of surviving to the end of the year, s, assuming that the hazard rate is constant over the year, is then the ratio of the numbers of that cohort surviving to the end of the year, m -1 / 2 d, over the number at the start of the year, m + 1 / 2 d. This can be rearranged to give s = (2-h)/(2+h). The evidence suggests that the increase in hazard rate is linear in pollutants, so that if in one year pollution increases, the hazard rate will increase to h′ = h(1+θ). We are interested in relating the mortality impact to the emissions in a single year, that in turn can be related back to the level of traffic in that year, so a single year change is appropriate. The hazard rate varies with age, a, and can be approximated by an exponential function (which fits extremely well above the age of 30; below that hazard rates are low in any case). For our purposes we are interested in the impact of pollution on life expectancy, and particularly on the expected number of QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years). The value of QALY/year decreases with age, but we ignore this effect and assume any change in life expectancy is an equal change in QALYs. This will exaggerate the impact of pollution slightly. Let the expected life of a person aged a be L a , and the proportion surviving the year be s a.. Life expectancy of someone dying in the year is taken as half a year, and otherwise survival brings the life expected on a year-older person, giving the recursion relation:
The effect on life expectancy of an increase in s a to s a ' is then This can be summed over the population, weighting the change in life expectancy by the number of people exposed of that age. The information to make this calculation are available from population statistics, and ONS (2001, section 5) contains the relevant data. As risks are linear in pollution, it is legitimate to take average values, providing the population over which the average is taken has the same pattern of life-expectancy.
Many countries monitor concentrations at various sites, and identify the contributing sources. Thus for the UK in 1999 20% of total PM 10 emissions came from road transport sources, while the annual average concentration of PM 10 was 20µg/m 3 (measured at 2 rural sites), 23µg/m 3 in 25 urban central and industrial sites, 22µg/m3 in 15 urban background and 4 suburban sites, 27µg/ m 3 at 4 busy roadside sites, and 37µg/ m 3 at 3 city centre kerbside sites. 15 The country-wide average of pollution caused by traffic is then 20% of 22µg/m 3 = 4.4µg/m 3 . It may be that rural traffic contribution to pollution are small, and urban contributions, high, as Maddison et. al (1996) argue. Rather than compute the traffic proportion by location and then sum over the affected population, it seems more direct to take the country The next step is to relate changes in pollution to changes in hazard rates. The estimated effect of an increase of 10 :g/m 3 in pollution is to raise the daily mortality rate by about 1% (Maddison et. al, 1996) . Somewhat later estimates from highly polluted developing countries suggest figures as high as 1.3% (+/-0.5%), the average value found for Bangkok (EF&EE, 2002, p5) . Thus UK traffic pollution might account for increased mortality rates of 1% x 0.46 = 0.44%, raising it by a factor of 1.0044) at all ages, and making θ = 0.0044.
This number is in itself hard to interpret, and it is not clear whether it is large or small. In fact it is very small, in terms of reduced life expectancy per person. Using the formula above, the average reduction in life expectancy of a single year's traffic pollution is 0.21 days. The total number of QALY lost by one year's traffic pollution in Britain is therefore 58 million x 0.21/365 years = 34,000 QALYs. At £36,000/QALY, this amounts to £1.2 billion/yr. Figure A1 below shows why the reduction in life expectancy is so small. 16 It shows the effect of a 10% increase in mortality rates (corresponding to an increase of pollution of 75 :g/m 3 for ever in a developing country, rather than 4.4 :g/m 3 for one year). Mortality rates are so low for most people that a 10% increase in the rate is barely perceptible (note it is not an increase to 10%, which would be shockingly high). The shift in the mortality rate to the left is only visible at advanced ages and high background mortality rates, where the fraction of the population at risk is also very small. 16 Another way to put this into perspective is to note that male mortality rates are uniformly more than 50% higher than female rates in Britain in 1999 and 150% higher for males aged 25-34, though female life expectancy is only 7% higher despite their considerably lower mortality risk.
Appendix B The Marginal Social Cost of Vehicle Noise
The basic equation for the 18 hourly average value of L 10 (which is the average value of the hourly L 10 , itself defined as the noise level in dB(A) which is exceeded only 10% of the time) is where N is noise in dB(A), ln is the natural logarithm, v is speed in kph, Q = C + F is the 18 hour traffic flow in vehicles (C is the number of cars or equivalent light vehicles and F is the number of heavy vehicles), and p is the percentage of heavy vehicles in the flow (100F/Q). There are additional additive corrections for distance (these values are at the roadside) and barriers or reflections, which are not relevant to the calculations we need to perform.
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The effect of increasing the number of vehicles, Q, without changing the proportions of heavy vehicles, p, or their speed, 18 can be found by differentiation:
from which it follows that a 1% increase in traffic (i.e. ∆Q/Q = 0.01) leads to an increase in noise ∆N of 0.0434 dB(A). Tinch (1995) suggests as the best estimate for the willingness to pay for a 1dB(A) improvement is £7.75/head (+/-£2.25) at 1995 prices, or £9.15 at 2000 prices. Taken literally, this would suggest that a 1% increase in traffic would cost each person 40p/year or £21 million for the extra 4.7 billion veh. km, or 0.5p/veh. km. The intriguing feature of the noise relationship, and the claim that noise costs are linear in dB(A), is that a 1% reduction in traffic on a distant motorway is as valuable to those affected as a 1% fall in traffic on a busy city street or a leafy suburb, for someone sitting outdoors facing the road, or inside their doubleglazed house. The damage done from a proportional increase in traffic everywhere is also proportional to the affected population, which is here taken as 58 million (i.e. everyone). These implications encourage a degree of scepticism. The figures might reasonably be halved as not all the population is likely to be really troubled, and that as noise gets worse, so people take evasive action (deciding where to take their weekends or whether to install double glazing, etc). A more important implication is that transferring traffic from less to more heavily trafficked roads reduces total noise (as the reduction would be a greater percentage of a smaller number than the increase would be of the larger number). Providing that not too many more people are affected by the busier road, there will be a net saving in noise costs. Transport corridors and very high capacity motorways are therefore environmentally advantageous. The next step is to apportion the costs between light and heavy vehicles, as their contributions interact in a rather complex way. Differentiate (1) with respect to the number of cars, C and heavy vehicles, F, holding other vehicle numbers constant, to give, after some simplification:
17 Thus for a person at a distance d meters, the term -log (d/13.5) is added. Presumably the use of average traffic flows implies that this is the relevant average noise for measuring average noise nuisance. 18 The conceptual experiment is thus across roads of similar traffic and speed. Clearly increasing traffic is likely to reduce speed on any given road. 
for cars, and for heavy vehicles. This has the implication that a 1% increase in heavy vehicles creates less increase in noise than a 1% increase in light vehicles when the traffic speed is 50kph if the percentage of heavy vehicles, p, is less than 9% (i.e. in towns) or less than 15% on motorways (where v = 100kph). Put another way, an extra heavy vehicle at these critical proportions is respectively 11 or 7 times as noisy as an extra light vehicle.
As the division between vehicle types depends very much on the level of traffic, the speed, and the percentage share, p, the final estimate was based on a sample of roads of differing characteristics (flow, speed, traffic composition), and the effect of a 1% change in each vehicle type was averaged over these sample roads, resulting in the 9% of veh. km by heavy goods vehicles (HGV) and buses accounting for 30% of the total marginal cost of noise. At 2000 traffic levels and prices, the marginal cost of a car is 0.4p/km (taking the high value of exposed population, or half that for a more cautious assessment), and of an HGV is 2p/km (or, more cautiously, 1p/km). 
